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1 Introduction
School choice programs consider systematic procedures for assigning students to schools.
Each student submits a list of preferences of schools to a central placement authority,
such as the school district. This central authority, then decides to which students will at-
tend each school. An algorithm (or mechanism) selects a matching of students to schools
considering students’ reported preferences over schools and on schools’ priority rankings
that determine who will get a seat in case a school is over demanded. A major concern
in the design of school choice programs has been to secure the selection of fair matchings
of students to schools. That is, all the students that obtain a seat at a given school
should have a higher priority at that school than the students who preferred that school
rather than the one they are matched to. In the recent years, a vast majority of school
districts have implemented school choice algorithms based on Gale and Shapley’s De-
ferred Acceptance Algorithm (DA)(Gale and Shapley, 1962; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez,
2003; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005; Pathak, 2016). The application of DA with propos-
ing students always selects a stable matching, that is a fair, individually rational, and
non-wasteful matching.1
In the canonical school choice problem priorities are a primitive of the model (Balin-
ski and So¨nmez, 1999; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). School districts use several
criteria in determining a priority order for a school based on different characteristics of
the potential students as walk-zone, number of siblings in the school, and other socio-
economic characteristics. Arbitrary tie-breaking criteria are often necessary to solve ties
when students share the same characteristics.2
We propose a new model that relies on students’ characteristics as primitives instead
of schools’ priorities. Students are initially endowed with characteristics specific to each
school. Each school priorities are defined over pairs of students and students’ specific
1A matching is individually rational if no student is assigned to a school that she rather not to attend.
A matching is non-wasteful if for each student every school that she prefers to the school she is assigned
to has filled all her available seats.
2In Boston, neighborhood walk-zone and having siblings in the school are the characteristics that
determine schools’ priorities(Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005). In Spain, characteristics as family income,
number of siblings, siblings attending the school, or “legacy” points if her parents or older siblings
attended that school are also considered. See Go´rtazar et al. (2020); Casalmiglia et al. (2020) for detailed
descriptions of Barcelona and Madrid priority systems.
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characteristics for that school. Students can exchange the characteristics of different
schools and affect to their position in the priority ranking of those schools. In this context,
a matching that Pareto improves an initial matching but may not respect fairness under
the priority rankings of students generated by the initial distribution of characteristics, but
it may be admissible on fairness grounds after an exchange of the relevant characteristics
among the improving students.3
We propose a class of school choice algorithms, Student Exchange with Transferable
Characteristics (SETC). Each algorithm in this class selects a constrained efficient ex-
tended matching. That is, the outcome of a SETC algorithm is a matching of students to
schools and a redistribution of specific transferable characteristics such that i) the match-
ing is stable with respect to schools’ priorities for the new distribution of characteristics,
and ii) the matching is not Pareto dominated by another stable matching with respect
to further admissible redistributions of characteristics. Every such constrained efficient
extended matching can be obtained by an algorithm in the SETC class (Theorem 1).
Moreover, a specific algorithm in the SETC family, the Top Trade SETC algorithm, that
replicates the idea behind the application of Gale’s Top Trade Cycle Mechanism (TTCM)
a` la Shapley and Scarf (1974) is well defined when school priorities are monotonous and
fully transferable (Theorem 2).
Our approach can be useful to improve the efficiency in situations where in the for-
mation of priorities we can distinguish between allocative criteria (as the tiebreaker) and
fairness constraints (as the need for siblings to attend the same school). For example, we
can think about the allocation of medical resources. Consider a situation where public
medical services are regionally managed as in Spain. In this case a patient may be eligible
for a different treatment or drug depending on her characteristics (like age, life expectancy
3An obvious candidate for such a transferable characteristic would be the exchange of the tie-breaking
lottery draws at different schools when different schools use different tie-breaking criteria. Multiple tie-
breaking criteria are justified since they reduce the chances that over-demanded schools systematically
reject a student that has a bad lottery draw (Arnosti, 2016). The Amsterdam’s school choice program
reform in 2014 introduced a system based on DA with multiple tie-breaking criteria. In 2015 this decision
was challenged in court by families who wished to switch school seats that could be justified with an
exchange of the priorities obtained with multiple tie-breaking criteria. The issue is discussed in Ashlagi
et al. (2019) and https://www.nemokennislink.nl/publicatiesschoolstrijd-in-amsterdam/ (Schoolstrijd in
Amsterdam) (Arnout Jaspers, Kennislink, July 1, 2015, accessed May 21st 2020).
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or health) and on the bundle of treatments acquired by her regional government. If we
consider that patients’ characteristics are determinant to access treatment and the pa-
tient residence only as an allocative criterion the algorithms in the SETC class allow us
to implement welfare improving exchanges of treatments or drugs across regions while
respecting fairness requirements.
1.1 Related Literature
The school choice problem was first presented by Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) that intro-
duce the idea of fairness to allocate seats to students. Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)
analyze the problem from a mechanism design perspective. The authors show that the
students proposing DA always selects stable matchings and it is strategy-proof.4 They
also study an adaptation of the Gale’s TTCM (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) and show that
it always selects Pareto efficient matchings and it is strategy-proof. Unfortunately, stable
matchings are not efficient and the level of inefficiency of a stable matching can be severe
(Dur and Morrill, 2017; Kesten, 2010; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2009)
There have been several attempts to alleviate the conflict between stability and effi-
ciency by weakening the notion of fairness. Kesten (2010) proposes the Efficiency Adjusted
Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (EADAM) that finds a constrained efficient matching by
analyzing the possibility that students consent to renounce to their priorities over schools
where they cannot obtain a seat under the students proposing DA.5 Alcalde and Romero-
Medina (2017) propose an alternative weakening of fairness: α-equitability. Ehlers and
Morrill (2019) relax the fairness constraint and propose a stable set of legal matchings
that are not dominated in fairness terms by any other legal matching. Finally, Alva and
Manjunath (2019) present the concept of stable domination.
The paper closer to ours is Dur et al. (2019) that proposes an alternative weakening
of stability, partial stability. Under partial stability some priorities of some students at
some schools can be ignored. Then it explores the welfare gains that can be captured by
applying the improvement cycles proposed by Erdil and Ergin (2008). Our paper shares
with Dur et al. (2019) the use of improvement cycles. Beyond this point both papers have
considerable differences. First, the primitives in our model are not the schools’ priorities
4A mechanism is strategy-proof if students have incentives to report their true preferences.
5See also Tang and Yu (2014) for an alternative algorithm for the EADAM.
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but the students’ individual characteristics in which those priorities are based. Second, in
our case the resulting extended matching is an allocation of both school seats and students’
characteristics. Third, the possible welfare gains we capture derive from the exchange
of characteristics. That is, the resulting extended matching is justified with the final
allocation of transferable characteristics. Fourth, all students that are relocated to a new
school are strictly better off. However, the SETC considers exchanges of characteristics
and, contrary to the stable improvement cycle algorithm in Erdil and Ergin (2008), some
of the students that participate in these cycles only exchange their characteristics and
facilitate other exchanges, and they are weakly better off. Finally, there is a technical
difference. Our framework does not require the introduction of additional conditions on
the set of priorities that may be ignored.6 Our results only require that school priorities
are monotonic in students’ characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model
and notation. In Section 3, we present our main results that we prove in Section 4. In
Section 5, we relate our framework of transferable characteristics to the school choice with
consent proposed by Kesten (2010). In Section 6, we conclude.
2 Notation and Definitions
We present the standard school choice problem and then introduce the extended model
with partially transferable characteristics.
Let I be a finite set of students and S a finite set of schools where students have to be
allocated. Each student i is equipped with a strict preference Pi over S∪{∅},7 where {∅}
stands for the option of being unassigned. We denote by Ri the weak preference relation
associated to Pi defined in the standard way and by P a generic students’ preference
profile. Let P denote the set of all students’ preference profiles. Each school s has a
limited number of seats available qs.
A matching is a function µ : I → S∪{∅} such that (i) for each i ∈ I, µ(i) ∈ S∪{∅}
and (ii) for each s ∈ S, #µ−1(s) ≤ qs. A matching µ′ Pareto dominates the matching
µ if for each i ∈ I, µ′(i) Ri µ(i), and for some j ∈ I, µ′(j) Pj µ(j).
6Assumption 1 in Dur et al. (2019). See Remark 1 in Section 2.
7A strict preference is a complete, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation.
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The final component of the school choice problem is the priorities of schools. Each
school ranks prospective students according to a priority order. Our contribution is to
explore the structure of such priority orders. We consider that school priorities may
depend on different characteristics of students. Some of those characteristics are intrinsic
to each student, but some characteristics can be exchanged between students. The relevant
priorities for schools depend on the final allocation of such characteristics.
For each student i let ω(i) = (ωs(i))s∈S be the initial vector of transferable charac-
teristics that influence the position of student i at each school. Each student initial en-
dowment consists of transferable characteristics specific to each school. For each school
s, let Ωs = ∪i∈Iωs(i) be s’s set of available transferable characteristics. For each school s
let λs be a bijection from students to Ωs. That is, λs is a permutation of s’s transferable
characteristics between the students. For each i ∈ I, and s ∈ S there is j ∈ I with
λs(i) = ωs(j), and for each j, j′ ∈ I, λs(j) 6= λs(j′). For each s, let Ls be the set of all
permutations of s’s transferable characteristics between students. We call λ = (λs)s∈S
an allocation of transferable characteristics. Finally, for each student i and each
allocation λ, λ(i) ≡ (λs(i))s∈S. We denote by ω the initial endowment allocation of
transferable characteristics.
When the characteristics are transferable, the assignment of such characteristics is
relevant. Note that each admissible λ ∈ L can be obtained via exchange cycles of charac-
teristics between the students. An extended matching is a pair (µ, λ) such that µ is a
matching and λ ∈ L. Let M be the set of all extended matchings.
In the extended framework, school priorities do not compare only students, but pairs
of students and the allocations of transferable characteristic that they present to the
school choice process. Hence, each school is equipped with a complete, transitive, and
antisymmetric binary relation s on I ×Ωs. We use the notation %s to refer to the weak
priority relation associated to s.
Throughout this paper, we assume that transferable characteristics are monotonous
in the sense that affect all the students in the same direction.
Monotonous Priorities For each i, j and s, for each l, l′ ∈ Ωs: (i, l) s (i, l′) if and
only if (j, l) s (j, l′).
6
Under monotonous priorities, for each s the set Ωs is naturally ordered and, abusing
notation, for each Λs ⊆ Ωs we define
max{Λs} ≡ {l ∈ Λs, for each i ∈ I, l′ ∈ Λs, (i, l) %s (i, l′)}.
Remark 1. Under monotonous priorities, for each school s, each i0, i1, i2, i3 ∈ I, and
each extended priority %, if
s (i1, λs(i1)) s (i2, λs(i2)) s (i3, λs(i3)), and
(i3,max{λs(i0), λs(i3)}) %s (i1, λs(i1))
then (i3,max{λs(i0), λs(i3)}) %s (i2, λs(i2)).
Finally, we present the stability notion that takes into account the fact that school
priorities depend on the identity of the students and some transferable characteristics.
An extended matching (µ, λ) is (ex-post) stable if:
• µ is λ-fair : for each i, j ∈ I, µ(j) Pi µ(i) implies (j, λs(j)) µ(j) (i, λs(i)).
• µ is individually rational : for each i ∈ I, µ(i) Ri {∅}
• µ is not wasteful : if for no i ∈ N and s ∈ S, s Pi µ(i) and #µ−1(s) < qs.
The interpretation of (ex-post) stable coincides with the natural notion of stability. An
(ex-post) stable extended matching does not generate complaints of students that would
like to improve the school that they are assigned to. The matching proposed is justified
with the final allocation of transferable characteristics.
It is worth to note that our notion of (ex-post) stable is parallel to partial stability in
Dur et al. (2019) but we provide a rationale and structure to the admissible violations of
the initial priorities. In the light of Remark 1, our extended priority structure does not
call for the introduction of additional restrictions on the set of admissible violations of
fairness as Assumption 1 in Dur et al. (2019).
We are interested in obtaining (ex-post) stable extended matching that are not Pareto
dominated by other (ex-post) stable extended matchings. If there is no possibility of
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exchange of transferable characteristics, the students proposing deferred acceptance algo-
rithm selects the student optimal stable extended matching (SOSM). The (ex-post) stable
(µ, ω) is the student optimal stable extended matching (SOSM) if µ is not Pareto
dominated by another (ex-post) stable extended matching (ν, ω).
When the students may exchange their transferable characteristics, we could find (ex-
post) stable extended matchings (µ, λ) such µ Pareto dominates the SOSM matching. We
focus on extended matchings that can be obtained by limited exchanges of transferable
characteristics that lead to changes that justify the change of the students’ match. Given
an extended matching (µ, λ), we say (µ¯, λ¯) is a reshuffle of (µ, λ) if for each i ∈ I, for
each s /∈ {µ(i), µ¯(i)}, λs(i) = λ¯s(i).
We are now in condition to present the notion that captures the idea of obtaining
efficient matchings that are required to satisfy fairness and stability when transferable
characteristics can be exchanged.
An extended matching (µ, λ) is constrained efficient if it is (ex-post) stable and for
no (ex-post) stable reshuffle (µ′, λ′), µ′ Pareto dominates µ.
Example 1. Let I = {i1, i2, i3}, S = {s1, s2, s3}, qsx = 1 for x = 1, 2, 3. The students’
preferences are:
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3
s2 s1 s1
s1 s2 s2
s3 s3 s3
Each school uses two criteria to determine their priorities. They consider whether
students have a sibling already enrolled at the school and whether they live in the walk-
zone of the school. These criteria determine four coarse priority classes in each school.
Each school prioritizes students with Sibling+Walk-Zone, and those students who have
a Sibling but do not live in the Walk-Zone to students who live in its Walk-Zone with
no enrolled Sibling. Finally, the inverse natural order breaks ties inside each priority
class.
Assume that no student has any sibling and walk-zone characteristics are transferable.
Student i1 lives in school s1 walk-zone, Student i2 lives in school s2 walk-zone, while
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student i3 lives out of the school district. No student lives in s3’s walk-zone or has a sibling
in s3. Hence, we can write the initial endowment allocation of transferable characteristics:
ω(i1)
ω(i2)
ω(i3)
 =

(ωs1(i1), ω
s2(i1), ω
s3(i1))
(ωs1(i2), ω
s2(i2), ω
s3(i2))
(ωs1(i3), ω
s2(i3), ω
s3(i3))
 =

(1, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 0)
 .
Schools’ priorities under the initial endowment allocation of transferable characteristics
are:
s1 s2 s3
(i1, 1) (i2, 1) (i3, 0)
(i3, 0) (i3, 0) (i2, 0)
(i2, 0) (i1, 0) (i1, 0)
The SOSM for the initial endowment of transferable characteristics is (µ, ω) with µ =
{(i1, s1), (i2, s2), (i3, s3)}.
When students {i1, i2} exchange their transferable characteristics, the allocation of
exchangeable characteristics is
λ(i1)
λ(i2)
λ(i3)
 =

(λs1(i1), λ
s2(i1), λ
s3(i1))
(λs1(i2), λ
s2(i2), λ
s3(i2))
(λs1(i3), λ
s2(i3), λ
s3(i3))
 =

(0, 1, 0)
(1, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0)
 ,
and schools’ extended priorities under λ are:
s1 s2 s3
(i2, 1) (i1, 1) (i3, 0)
(i3, 0) (i3, 0) (i2, 0)
(i1, 0) (i2, 0) (i1, 0)
The SOSM under λ is (µ′, λ) with µ′ = {(i1, s2), (i2, s1), (i3, s3)}. Clearly, µ Pareto
dominates µ′, and student i3 has not justified envy for i1 under the extended priorities
obtained with the allocation of transferable characteristics λ.
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3 Improvement Cycles for Extended Matchings
Our approach follows Erdil and Ergin (2008) and Dur et al. (2019) that propose a method
for finding fair Pareto improving trade cycles upon SOSM for coarse priorities with arbi-
trary tiebreakers and partially non-enforceable priorities respectively. In both papers, the
logic behind improving cycles is parallel. For an initial stable matching, if there’s a vacant
position at some school, that position may be assigned to one student such that no other
student with higher priority at that school prefers that vacant position to her position at
the initial matching. In our extended framework this rationale cannot be applied immedi-
ately. Although the students may be willing to accept any position at a desirable school,
depending on the student that exchanges the transferable characteristic some violation of
fairness may appear. For this reason, Pareto improvements involving two students may
require the participation of additional students who just swap transferable characteristics
without involving a change of school. Moreover, once a student leaves a position in a
school, she may start a process similar to a vacancy chain (Blum et al., 1997). The first
student in the priority ranking of the school may be admitted in the school without any
need of the exchange in the transferable characteristics since the student that leaves the
vacant position obtains a position at a preferred school.
Given an (ex-post) stable extended matching (µ, λ), for each school j ∈ I, let:
• D(µ,λ)(j) = {i ∈ I : µ(j) Ri µ(i)} and D˜(µ,λ)(j) = {i ∈ I : µ(j) Pi µ(i)}.
• X(µ,λ)(j) = {i ∈ D(µ,λ)(j) : ∀k ∈ D˜(µ,λ)(j)\{i}, (i,max{λs(i), λs(j)}) s (k, λs(k))}.
The set D˜(µ,λ)(j) contains all the students who prefer the match for student j rather than
their own match. The set D(µ,λ)(j) also includes all students who are matched to µ(j).
The set X(µ,λ)(j) includes all the students who would be willing to occupy j’s position at
µ(j) and there would not be any instance of envy if they are matched to µ(j) should j
leave her position. The members of X(µ,λ)(j) are those students in D(µ,λ)(j) that either
after they obtain λµ(j)(j) or maintaining λµ(j)(j) are ranked above the remaining members
of D˜(µ,λ)(j). Hence, if j moves to a preferred school and a member of X(µ,λ)(j) gets j’s
position at µ(j), nobody could argue that the change violates her priority over µ(j).
Let G = (V ;E) be a directed graph with the set of vertices V , and the set of directed
edges E, which is a set of ordered pairs of V .
10
For each extended matching (µ, λ), G(µ, λ) = (I;E(µ, λ)) is the (directed) application
graph associated with (µ, λ) where the set of directed edges E(µ, λ) ⊆ I × I is as follows:
ij ∈ E(µ, λ) (that is, i points to j) if and only i ∈ X(µ,λ)(j). A set of edges φ =
{i1i2, i2i3, . . . , inin+1} is a path if the vertices i1i2, i2i3, . . . , inin+1 are distinct, and a cycle
if the vertices i1i2, i2i3, . . . , inin+1 are distinct and i1 = in+1. A student i is involved in
the cycle φ if there is a student j such that ij ∈ φ. A cycle φ = {i1i2, i2i3, . . . , inin+1}
is solved when for each ij ∈ φ, student i is assigned to µ(j) to obtain a new matching.
Formally, we denote the solution of a cycle by the operation ◦ that is, η = φ ◦ µ if and
only if for each ij ∈ φ , η(i) = µ(j), and for each i′ /∈ {i1, . . . , in} η(i′) = µ(i′). A cycle φ
is an improvement cycle for G(µ, λ) if there is ij ∈ φ such that i ∈ D˜(µ,λ)(j).
The following algorithm is built on an (ex-post) stable extended matching and is defined
by solving cycles iteratively:
Student Exchange with Transferable Characteristics (SETC):
Step 0: Let (µ0, λ0) be an (ex-post) stable extended matching.
Step k ≥ 1: Given an extended matching (µk−1, λk−1),
(k.1) if there is no improvement cycle in G(µk−1, λk−1), then the algorithm terminates
and (µk−1, λk−1) is the matching obtained,
(k.2) otherwise, solve one of the improvement cycles in G(µk−1, λk−1) say φk let µk =
φk ◦ µk−1, and define λk as follows. For each i ∈ I, let sk = µk(i) and s0 = µ0(i).
• For each s /∈ {s0, sk}, λsk(i) = λs0(i).
• If there is no i′ such that ii′ ∈ φk, then λskk (i) = λskk−1(i).
• If there is i′ such that ii′ ∈ φk then λskk (i) = max{λskk−1(i), λskk−1(i′)}.
• If there is j such that λs00 (i) = λs0k (j), then λs0k (i) = λs00 (j), otherwise λs0k (i) =
λs00 (i).
Since the sets of schools and students are finite, the algorithm stops in a finite number
of steps. Actually, there are at most 1
2
#I(#I − 1) possible Pareto improvements. The
definition provides a class of algorithms since there can be several incompatible Pareto
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improvements and the order in which cycles are solved may lead to different final outcomes.
The next example shows the relevance for constructing improvement cycles of students
who do not strictly benefit from the exchange of transferable characteristics.
Example 2. Let I = {i1, i2, i3, i4}, S = {s1, s2, s3}, qsx = 1 for x = 1, 3; and qs2 = 2.
The students’ preferences are:
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4
s2 s1 s1 s2
s1 s2 s2 s3
s3 s3 s3 s1
Each school uses two criteria to determine their priorities. Schools 1 and 3 consider
whether students have a sibling already enrolled at the school and whether they live in
the walk-zone of the school. These criteria determine four coarse priority classes in each
school. Each school prioritizes students with both characteristics Sibling+Walk-Zone,
and those students who have a Sibling but do not live in the Walk-Zone to students who
live in its Walk-Zone with no enrolled Sibling. Finally, the inverse natural order breaks
ties inside each priority class. School s2 orders students according to the outcome of the
exam, using the Walk-Zone for breaking ties (and eventually with the inverse natural
tiebreaker). Students i1 and i2 live in s1’s walk-zone. Student i1 has a sibling in s1 but
their parents would like to move their children to s2. Student i4 has the highest test-score
overall for s2 while students i1, i2 and i3 have same test-score ranking. Finally, student
i4 lives in s2’s walk-zone.
ω(i1)
ω(i2)
ω(i3)
ω(i4)
 =

(ωs1(i1), ω
s2(i1), ω
s3(i1))
(ωs1(i2), ω
s2(i2), ω
s3(i2))
(ωs1(i3), ω
s2(i3), , ω
s3(i3))
(ωs1(i4), ω
s2(i4), , ω
s3(i4))
 =

(1, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 0)
 .
Schools’ priorities under the initial endowment allocation of transferable characteristics
are:
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s1 s2 s3
(i1, 1) (i4, 1) (i4, 0)
(i2, 1) (i3, 0) (i3, 0)
(i4, 0) (i2, 0) (i2, 0)
(i3, 0) (i1, 0) (i1, 0)
Moreover, (i3, 1) s1 (i2, 1) and (i1, 1) s2 (i2, 0).
The SOSM for the initial endowment of transferable characteristics is (µ, ω) with µ =
{(i1, s1), (i2, s3), (i3, s2), (i4, s2)}. The assignment µ′ = {(i1, s2), (i2, s3), (i3, s1), (i4, s2)}
Pareto dominates µ but if i1 and i3 exchange their transferable characteristics, then the
resulting extended matching would result in justified envy since ωs2(i3) = 0 and (i2, 0) s2
(i1, 0). However, if student i4 participates in the exchange of characteristics, we would
obtain the reshuffle λ:
λ(i1)
λ(i2)
λ(i3)
λ(i4)
 =

(λs1(i1), λ
s2(i1), λ
s3(i1))
(λs1(i2), λ
s2(i2), , λ
s3(i2))
(λs1(i3), λ
s2(i3), λ
s3(i3))
(λs1(i4), λ
s2(i4), λ
s3(i4))
 =

(0, 1, 0)
(1, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0)
 ,
and the extended matching (µ′, λ) is (ex-post) stable.
Starting from the initial SOSM, in Figure 1 we present the graph where each student
points to the positions that students whose position would like to occupy (including indif-
ference relations). In Figure 2 we show the strict improvements that would not generate
justified envy and observe that no cycle can be constructed. Note that i1 does not point
i3 because (i2, ω
s2
i2
) s2 (i1,max{ωs2i1 , ωs2i3 }). Finally, in Figure 3 and we present the graph
associated to (µ, ω). We observe the existence of a unique cycle γ = i1i4i3i1. Solving γ
generates the extended matching (µ′, λ). In Figure 4, we present the graph G(µ′, λ). The
graph contains no improvement cycle and indeed the extended matching (µ′, λ) is (ex-post)
stable.
Remark 2. The school priorities presented in Example 2 are consistent with point-system
based priorities. Point-systems generate additively separable extended priorities. That is
for each school s, for each pair of students ix, iy and each λ
s, λ¯s ∈ Ωs, (ix, λs) s (iy, λs)
if and only if (ix, λ¯
s) s (iy, λ¯s).
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s2
s1 s3
+ +
++
i3
i1 i2
i4
Figure 1: Example 2. Student ix points student iy if ix ∈ D(µ,ω)(iy). Solid lines: ix points
iy if ix ∈ D˜(µ,ω)(iy). Dotted Lines: ix points iy if ix ∈ D(µ,ω)(iy) , µ(ix) = µ(iy).
s2
s1 s3
+ +
++
i3
i1 i2
i4
Figure 2: Example 2. Graph associated to (µ, ω). Student ix points student iy if ix ∈
X(µ,ω)(iy) and µ(ix) 6= µ(iy).
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s2
s1 s3
+ +
++
i3
i1 i2
i4
Figure 3: Example 2. G(µ, ω). Student ix points student iy if ix ∈ X(µ,ω)(iy).
s2
s1 s3
+ +
++
i4
i3 i2
i1
Figure 4: Example 2. G(µ′, λ). Student ix points student iy if ix ∈ X(µ,ω)(iy).
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Next, we present our main result. It turns out that starting from any (ex-post) stable
extended matching the application of an algorithm in the SETC class always yields a
constrained efficient and (ex-post) stable extended matching. Moreover, any constrained
efficient extended stable matching can be obtained from a SETC algorithm starting at the
SOSM extended matching. Hence, the SETC class identifies all the improvement cycles
that yield an (ex-post) stable extended matchings.
Theorem 1. For each problem, an extended matching is constrained efficient and Pareto
dominates the SOSM if and only if it is obtained by an algorithm within the SETC class
starting with the SOSM extended matching.
The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in the next section. The proof follows similar
arguments to the proof of Dur et al. (2019) but the extended model generates impor-
tant intricacies. Transferable characteristics differ between students and only exchanges
involving specific students in a school may be mutually viable. Moreover, improvement
cycles may need to involve students who do not strictly improve by the exchange but
facilitate the reassignment by trading their transferable characteristics.
Two immediate consequences follow from Theorem 1. Since the result of a SETC is
constrained efficient and (ex-post) stable with respect to the final allocation of transferable
characteristics, then it is the result of the SOSM for the final allocation of transferable
characteristics.
Corollary 1. For each problem and each stable matching µ0 and each algorithm in the
SETC class, if the extended matching (µ, λ) is the outcome of the SETC algorithm then
(µ, λ) is the SOSM with an initial endowment of transferable characteristics λ.
We conclude this section analyzing the incentives of students to reveal their true
preferences when the allocation of schools’ seats is determined by an algorithm in the
SETC class. For that purpose, we need to introduce further notation that relates the
outcomes of different problems defined in different preference profiles.
A mechanism is a mapping Ψ : P →M. The application of a SETC algorithm start-
ing with the SOSM extended matching corresponding to each preference profile defines a
mechanism that always selects a (ex-post) stable and constrained efficient extended match-
ing. We call the class of such mechanisms as the students’ optimal with transferable
characteristics (SOTC) class of rules.
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Strategy-proofness A mechanism Ψ satisfies strategy-proofness if for each i ∈ N ,
each P, P ′ ∈ P such that for each j 6= i Pj = P ′j with Ψ(P ) = (µ, λ) and Ψ(P ′) = (µ′, λ′),
µ(i) Ri µ
′(i).
By the results in Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009); Kesten (2010); Alva and Manjunath
(2019); Kesten and Kurino (2019), since the matching selected by any SETC algorithm
starting with the SOSM matching Pareto dominates the SOSM matching for the initial en-
dowment of characteristics and it results in efficient allocations, any SETC is manipulable
at some profile of students’ preferences.
Proposition 1. There is no mechanism in the SOTC class that satisfies strategy-proofness.
Proof. Let A be an algorithm in the SETC, define the SOTC mechanism Ψ that for each
profile of students’ preferences selects the matching obtained through the application of
A at that preference profile. By Theorem 1, for each preference profile the matching
selected by Ψ is (ex-post) stable and Pareto efficient. For each P ∈ P , Ψ selects an
extended matching that represents a Pareto improvement upon the SOSM matching. By
Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009), the SOSM is in the Pareto frontier of the set of mechanisms
that satisfy stability and strategy-proofness. Hence, Ψ violates strategy-proofness.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
Although Theorem 1 refers specifically to the application of SETC algorithms to the
SOSM extended matching, the analysis can be carried out from any arbitrary (ex-post)
stable extended matching. We study separately the proofs of necessity and sufficiency
sides of the results.
4.1 Proof of “if” part
For a given problem (R,%) and a stable extended matching (µ0, λ0) consider an algorithm
in the SETC class. Let K be the last step of the algorithm and (µk, λk) be the extended
matching selected at k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}. A cycle is solved at each step of the algorithm,
which implies that the students in the cycle are better off and no student is worse off at
the new matching obtained by solving the cycle. Thus, the matching at each step Pareto
dominates the matching in the previous step, and for each k ≥ 1, if student j is not
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involved in any improvement cycle at Step k, D˜(µk,λk)(j) ⊆ D˜(µk−1,λk−1)(j). Hence, if i
points to j in G(µk−1, λk−1) and both students are not involved in an improvement cycle
at Step k then i points to j in G(µk, λk).
Lemma 1. Each extended matching obtained by a SETC algorithm is stable.
Proof. Let (µk, λk} be the extended matching obtained at Step k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}. We
prove the result by induction on k. The initial extended matching (µ0, λ0) is stable.
Fairness Assume that (µk−1, λk−1) is fair. Take any pair of students (i, j) such that
µk(j) Pi µk(i). At each step of the algorithm, each student is either better off (she is
in a solved cycle) or she is assigned to the same school as in the previous step. Let φk
denote the improvement cycle solved in step k. Assume first that j is not involved in
the cycle φk. Since µk(j) Pi µk(i), µk−1(j) Pi µk−1(i) and i ∈ D˜(µk−1,λk−1)(j). Then,
by fairness of (µk−1, λk−1), (j, λµk−1(j)(j)) µk−1 (i, λµk−1(j)(i)). Since j is not involved
in φk, λ
µk−1(j)(j) = λµk(j)(j). Since i ∈ D˜(µk,λk)(j), λµk−1(j)(i) = λµk(j)(i). Therefore
(j, λµk(j)(j)) µk(j) (i, λµk(j)(i)). Assume now that j is involved in φk. Let j′ ∈ I be such
that j′j ∈ φk. Hence, µk−1(j′) Pi µk−1(i), i ∈ D˜(µk,λk)(j′), and λµk−1(j
′)(i) = λµk(j
′)(i).
Since j′j ∈ φk, (j,max{λµk−1(j
′)
k−1 (j
′), λµk−1(j)k−1 µk−1(j′) (i, λµk−1(j
′)(i)), and (j, λµk(j)(j)) µk(j)
(i, λµk(j)(i)). Since i, j are arbitrary, (µk, λk) is fair.
Individual Rationality Since µ0 is individually rational, and each student is never
worse off after each step of the algorithm, the µK is individually rational.
Non-Wastefulness The initial match µ0 is non wasteful. At each step students are
assigned to better schools swapping their positions at schools, hence #µ−1k (s) remains
constant at any step of the algorithm. Assume school s has an empty slot at step k,
then the school s has an empty slot at step 0. Since µ0 is non wasteful and individually
rational, for each student i with µ0(i) 6= s, µ0(i) Pi s. Since for each i, µk(i) Ri µ0(i),
µk(i) Ri s, and (µk, λk) satisfies non-wastefulness.
Lemma 2. For each stable extended matching (µ, λ) and j ∈ I, X(µ,λ)(j) ⊆ µ(µ−1(j))\{j}
if and only if D˜(µ,λ)(j) = {∅}.
Proof. If D˜(µ,λ)(j) = {∅}, since D(µ,λ)(j) = µ(µ−1(j)) and X(µ,λ)(j) ⊆ D(µ,λ)(j), the
result is immediate. On the other hand, if D˜(µ,λ)(j) 6= {∅}, then by completeness and
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transitivity of schools’ priorities there is i ∈ D˜(µ,λ)(j) such that for each i′ ∈ D˜(µ,λ)(j),
(i, λµ(j)(i)) %µ(j) (i′, λµ(j)(i′). By monotonicity of priorities, (i,max{λµ(j)(i), λµ(j)(i)}) µ(j)
(i, λµ(j)(i)). Therefore, µ(i) 6= µ(j) and i ∈ X(µ,λ)(j).
Lemma 3. Let (µ, λ) and (η, λ′) be (ex-post) stable extended matchings such that µ
Pareto dominates η. For each s ∈ S, #µ−1(s) = #η−1(s).
Proof. Let N = {i ∈ I : µ(i) Pi η(i)}. Since µ Pareto dominates η, for each j ∈ I \ N ,
µ(j) = η(j). Consider school s and assume that #(N ∩ µ−1(s)) > #(N ∩ η−1(s)). This
implies that #η−1(s) < qs. For each i ∈ N ∩ µ−1(s), µ(i) = s Pi η(i), which contradicts
η non-wastefulness. Hence, #(N ∩ µ−1(s)) ≤ #(N ∩ η−1(s)). Finally, assume to the
contrary there is s such that the strict inequality holds. Summing up the inequalities
across schools, the number of students in N who are assigned to some school in matching
η is larger than the number of students in N that are assigned to some school in matching
µ. Hence there is a student i ∈ N such that η(i) ∈ S, and µ(i) = {i}. Since η is a
individually rational matching, η(i) Pi µ(i) which contradicts the definition of N .
Lemma 4. An extended matching obtained by an SETC algorithm is constrained efficient.
Proof. Let (µ, λ) be an extended matching obtained by an SETC algorithm. By Lemma
1, (µ, λ) is (ex-post) stable. We show that there is no stable extended matching (ν, λ′)
such that ν Pareto dominates µ. Assume to the contrary, that (ν, λ′) is a (ex-post) stable
extended matching and ν dominates µ. By the definition of the SETC algorithms, there
is no improvement cycle in the graph G(µ, λ). There are two cases:
Case 1. For each j ∈ I D˜(µ,λ) = {∅}. Then for each ∈ I, X(µ,λ)(j) ⊆ µ−1(j) \ {j}. Thus
each student is assigned to her best school at µ and ν does not Pareto dominate µ
Case 2. There are chains in G(µ, λ) involving students who would like to change her
assigned school, but there is no cycle. This implies that there are students who are
only pointed by the students assigned to the same school.
Assume we are in Case 2. Since there is no improvement cycle, there is a set of students
who are not pointed by any other student in G(µ, λ). Let I1 = {i | D˜(µ,λ)(i) = ∅}. Let
i1 ∈ I1 and s1 = µ(i1). Note that for each j ∈ µ(s1), D˜(µ,λ)(j) = ∅ and µ(s1) ⊆ I1
Since ν Pareto dominates µ, there does not exist any j′ ∈ I, such that µ(j′) 6= s1 and
ν(j′) = s1. Thus ν−1(s1) ⊆ µ−1(s1). By Lemma 3, #µ−1(s1) = #ν−1(s1) and we get
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µ−1(s1) = ν−1(s1). Since i1 was arbitrary, this holds for each s such that µ−1(s)∩ I1 6= ∅.
Next, since there is no improvement cycle in G(µ, λ), then there is at least a student
in I \ I1 such that she is only pointed by students in I1. Otherwise, there would be an
improvement cycle or no improvement chains (Case 1). Let I2 = {i | D˜(µ,λ)(i) ⊆ I1} \ I1
be the set of such students. Let i2 ∈ I2 and s2 = µ(i2). We first show that there is no
j with µ(j) 6= s2 and ν(j) = s2. Assume to the contrary and since ν Pareto dominates
µ, s2 Pj µ(j) and thus, j ∈ D˜(µ,λ)(i2). Nevertheless, by definition i2 is only pointed
by students in I1. By the previous paragraph, for each j ∈ I1, µ(j) = ν(j). Hence,
ν−1(s2) ⊆ µ−1(s2). By Lemma 3, #µ−1(s2) = #ν−1(s2), and therefore µ−1(s2) = ν−1(s2).
We can continue applying the same argument iteratively, to conclude that all students
in any improving chain in G(µ, λ) have the same assignment under µ and ν. The students
who are not in a chain in G(µ, λ), are contained in I1 and have the same assignment in
both µ and ν. We conclude that µ = ν and ν does not Pareto dominate µ.
4.2 Proof of the “only if” part
Let (µ0, λ0) a partially stable extended matching. We prove that each constrained efficient
matching that Pareto dominates (µ0, λ0) can be obtained by an algorithm in the SETC
class.
We use again the notion of improvement cycle we introduced in the previous subsection
without making reference to the desirability graph. The following lemma is a crucial first
step for the construction of improvement cycles in the desirability graph.
Lemma 5. Let (µ, λ) and (ν, λ¯) be stable extended matchings such that ν Pareto dominates
µ. Then there exists a set of disjoint improvement cycles Γ = {γ1, . . . , γk} such that
ν = γk ◦ . . .◦γ1 ◦µ, and there is λ′′ obtained as in the definition of SETC such that (ν, λ′′)
is stable extended matching.
Proof. Let N ⊆ I be the set of students who strictly prefer their assignment under ν to
the assignment under µ or such that λ(i) 6= λ′(i). Partition the set N in three disjoint
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sets N = N1 ∪ N2 ∪N3. Define
N1 ≡ {i ∈ N | µ(i) = ν(i) & λ¯ν(i)(i) 6= λν(i)(i)},
N2 ≡ {i ∈M | µ(i) 6= ν(i) & λ¯ν(i)(i) 6= λν(i)(i)},
N3 ≡ {i ∈ N | µ(i) 6= ν(i) & λ¯ν(i)(i) = λν(i)(i)}.
Let m = #N and index the students in N in such that for each j, j′, j′′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
ij ∈ N1, ij′ ∈ N2, ij′′ ∈ N3 if and only if j < j′ < j′′. Let G˜[(µ, λ), (ν, λ′)] = (N,E) be a
directed graph where the edges E ⊆ N ×N are constructed in the following way:
• For each ij ∈ N1, ij points l if and only if λ¯µ(ij)(ij) = λµ(ij)(l).
• For each ij ∈ N2, ij points l if and only if λ¯ν(ij)(ij) = λν(ij)(l).
• For each ij ∈ N3, ij points an arbitrary student in l ∈ N such that l has not been
pointed by any ij′ with j
′ < j and µ(l) = ν(ij).8
In the graph G˜[(µ, λ), (ν, λ¯)], each student is pointed by a unique student and points
to a unique student in N . Since N is finite, each student is in a cycle and no two cycles
intersect. By construction, each of those cycles is an improvement cycle over µ and the
extended matching (ν, λ¯) is obtained solving these cycles in any order.
Lemma 6. Let (µ, λ) be an (ex-post) stable and (ν, λ¯) a (ex-post) stable reshuffle of
(µ, λ) such that ν Pareto dominates µ, then there exists a sequence of cycles (γ1, . . . , γk)
such that:
• γ1 appears in G(µ, λ).
• for each k′ ∈ {2, . . . , k}, γk′ in G(γk′−1 ◦ . . . ◦ γ1 ◦ (µ, λ)),
• γk ◦ γk−1 ◦ . . . ◦ γ1 ◦ (µ, λ).
Proof. By Lemma 5, we can construct a set of improvement cycles Φ = {φ1, . . . , φq}. The
result is trivial in the case where all the cycles in Φ appear in G(µ, λ): it follows that there
are disjoint cycles in G(µ, λ) and solving them in any order leads to ν and to some λ′
such that (ν, λ′) is an (ex-post) stable reshuffle of (µ, λ). To prove the alternative case, we
assume that none of the cycles in φ appears in G(µ, λ). This assumption is without loss
8Note that since (ν, λ¯) is a reshuffle of (µ, λ) such a student l exists for each ij ∈ N3.
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of generality because of the following observation. If a cycle φ ∈ Φ appears in G(µ, λ),
then this cycle is solved first and µ′ = φ ◦ µ is obtained. If another cycle φ′ ∈ Φ also
appears in G(µ′, λ∗), by the fact that all the cycles in Φ are disjoint and that if there
are two students forming a link in G(µ, λ),and those students do not belong to φ, then
the link also appears in G(µ′, λ∗). Following this logic, whenever a subset of cycles Φ
appear in G(µ, λ), these cycles are solved first, and we focus on the case where none of
the improvement cycles appear in G(µ, λ).
To show the existence of a cycle in G(µ, λ) first we prove that for any φ ∈ Φ and any
ij ∈ φ, there exists some k ∈ I such that kj ∈ G(µ, λ) and lk ∈ φ′ for some l ∈ I and
φ′ ∈ Φ. Consider an arbitrary φ ∈ Φ and ij ∈ φ.
• if i ∈ X(µ,λ)(j), then ij ∈ G(µ, λ) by construction. Moreover, i is a part of φ, which
implies there exists l ∈ I with li ∈ φ.
• if i /∈ X(µ,λ)(j), there exists a student i′ such that i′ ∈ D˜(µ,λ)(j) and (i′, λµ(j)(i′)) µ(j)
(i,max{λµ(j)(i), λµ(j)(j)}) %µ(j) (i, λµ(j)(i)). Let k be , between those students,
one such that (k,max{λµ(j)(k), λµ(j)(j)}) µ(j) (k′,max{λµ(j)(k′), λµ(j)(j)}) for each
k′ ∈ Dµ,λ)(j).9 Note that k ∈ X(µ,λ)(j), and therefore kj ∈ G(µ, λ). Finally, we
check that k is in an improvement cycle in Φ. That is, there is φ′ ∈ Φ such that
lk ∈ φ′ for some l ∈ I. Assume to the contrary that µ(k) = ν(k), and µ(j) Pk
µ(k) = ν(k). Note that k ∈ X(µ,λ)(j), i /∈ X(µ,λ)(j), ν(i) = µ(j), and λ¯µ(j)(i) =
max{λµ(j)(i), λµ(j)(j)}). Since (k, λµ(j)(k)) µ(j) (i,max{λµ(j)(i), λµ(j)(j)}), this is
a contradiction, since (ν, λ¯) is (ex-post) stable. Thus, ν(k) Pk µ(k), which implies
that k is in an improvement cycle in Φ.
Thus, for any student j who is in an improvement cycle ϕ ∈ Φ, there exists another
student k such that kj ∈ G(µ, λ) and k is in an improvement cycle φ′ ∈ Φ. Since the
set of students in improvement cycles is finite, and each student is pointed at least by
another student in N , and there exists a cycle γ1 in G(µ, λ). Note that for each ij ∈ φ
such that ij /∈ γ1, then ij /∈ G(µ, λ), and i /∈ X(µ,λ)(j).
We next show that the matching γ1 ◦ µ Pareto dominates µ and it is weakly Pareto
dominated by ν. Since γ1 ◦ µ solves a cycle in G(µ, λ) clearly γ1 ◦ µ Pareto dominates µ.
Hence, we focus on proving that ν (weakly) Pareto dominates γ1 ◦ µ. For any kj ∈ γ1
such that (γ1 ◦ µ)(k) 6= µ(k) note that (γ1 ◦ µ)(k) = µ(j).
9By our definition of extended priorities the existence of such a student k is ensured. See Remark 1.
22
• If kj ∈ φ for some φ ∈ Φ, then ν(k) = µ(j).
• If kj /∈ φ for any φ ∈ Φ, we claim that ν(k) Rk µ(j). Suppose that µ(j) Pk
ν(k), that is, k ∈ D˜(ν,λ¯)(j). Consider the student i ∈ I such that ij ∈ φ for
some φ ∈ Φ, so ν(i) = µ(j). By the definition of γ1, ij /∈ G(µ, λ). implies
λ¯µ(j)(i) = max{λµ(j)(i), λµ(j)(j)}). Since kj ∈ γ1, kj ∈ G(µ, λ) and ij /∈ G(µ, λ),
(k, λµ(j)(k)) µ(k) (i,max{λµ(j)(i), λµ(j)(j)}), which is a contradiction because (ν, λ¯)
is (ex-post) stable.
Thus, under the matching γ1 ◦µ, each student in γ1 is better off than under the matching
µ and worse off than under the matching ν. Each remaining student is assigned to the
same school to which she’s assigned under µ which implies that the matching γ1 ◦ µ
Pareto dominates µ and is weakly Pareto dominated by ν. Let λ1 be the allocation of
characteristics obtained by solving the cycle γ1 according to the definition of the SETC
algorithm. By the arguments in Lemma 1, (γ1 ◦ µ, λ1) is (ex-post) stable. If the extended
matching (γ1 ◦ µ) is equivalent to ν the proof is complete. If not we can use the same
argument inductively. By Lemma 6, there is a set of distinct improvement cycles, such
that the matching ν is obtained by solving these cycles over γ1 ◦ µ solving at each stage
a cycle that appears in the graph defined by the SETC algorithm.
5 Fully Transferable Characteristics
Theorem 1 is a general result without any reference to the construction of school priorities.
In this section we discuss the implications for specific definitions of priorities. In the case
that the transferable characteristics determine completely school priorities, when a student
participates in an improvement cycle, it is equivalent to the fact of giving up completely
the priorities the student have for a position at that school. With that intuition in mind,
we propose a restricted domain of priorities that are completely defined by the transferable
characteristics.
Fully Transferable Extended Priorities. For each i, i′, j, j′j ∈ I and s ∈ S, for each
λs, λ¯s ∈ Ls: (i, λs) s (i′, λ¯s) if and only if (j, λs) s (j′, λ¯s).
Under fully transferable priorities, the analysis of the algorithms in the SETC is sim-
pler, since any student that desires the position of another student can obtain it with
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the exchange of the transferable characteristics. Under fully transferable priorities, the
application of any SETC algorithm starting from the SOSM will stop at a constrained
efficient extended matching. On the other hand, any Pareto improvement cycle starting
at a (ex-post) stable extended matching would not generate any violation of fairness when
priorities are fully transferable. Therefore, every Pareto efficient extended matching that
improves upon the SOSM can be obtained as the outcome of a SETC algorithm.10
We devote the rest of this section to present an attractive subclass of SETC algorithms.
Before the formal definition of the algorithms, it’s worth to analyze the structure of the
application graph G when priorities are fully transferable.
Lemma 7. Let (µ, λ) be an (ex-post) stable extended matching and G(µ, λ) the (directed)
application graph associated with (µ, λ). If schools’ extended priorities are fully transfer-
able and i ∈ D˜(µ,λ)(j), then ij ∈ G(µ, λ).
Proof. Let s = µ(j). Since ∈ D˜(µ,λ)(j), s Pi µ(i). Since (µ, λ) is (ex-post) stable, for each
j′ 6= i such that s Pj′ µ(j′), (j, λs(j)) s (j′, λs(j′)). Therefore, since s extended priorities
are fully transferable, (i,max{λs(i), λs(j)}) s (j′, λs(j′)) and i ∈ X(µ,λ)(j).
The previous lemma implies that under fully transferable priorities improvement cycles
do not need the participation of students who transfer their characteristic but remain
assigned to the same school.
At this point, before we introduce a specific selection of cycles in SETC algorithms,
we need additional notation.
Let (µ, λ) be an extended matching. Define the graph G˜(µ, λ) ⊂ G(µ, λ) as the
restriction of G(µ, λ) where students only point to students assigned to different schools.
Hence, E = I and V are such that ij ∈ G˜(µ, λ) if and only if i ∈ D˜(µ,λ)(j) and i ∈ X(µ,λ)(j).
Let T0(µ) = I and recursively for each k ≥ 1
Bk(µ) = {i ∈ Tk−1(µ) | for each j ∈ Tk−1(µ), µ(i) Ri µ(j)} ,
and Tk(µ) = Tk−1(µ) \ Bk(µ). Let k∗ be the smallest integer such that Bk∗(µ) = {∅},
and T (µ) ≡ Tk∗ . The set B1(µ) contains the students that are assigned to their preferred
10This fact implies that the set of all possible matching obtained with the application of a SETC
algorithm starting from the SOSM is the set α-fair matchings as defined by Alcalde and Romero-Medina
(2017). In particular, the EADAM when all the students consent on waiving their priorities at every
school is the result of a SETC algorithm (Kesten, 2010).
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school at µ. Hence for each j ∈ B1(µ) there is not j′ such that jj′ ∈ G˜(µ, λ). Recursively,
for each k < k∗ and j ∈ Bk(µ), jj′ ∈ G˜(µ, λ) implies that j′ ∈ Bk′(µ) for some k′ < k.
This implies that students in I \T (µ) cannot participate in any Pareto improvement cycle.
Moreover, if T (µ) = {∅}, then the extended matching (µ, λ) is Pareto efficient. Finally,
for each extended matching (µ, λ) define the graph G′(µ, λ) ⊂ G˜(µ, λ), such that each
ij ∈ G′(µ, λ) if and only if i, j ∈ T (µ), ij ∈ G˜(µ, λ), and for each j′ ∈ T (µ), µ(j) Ri µ(j′).
Lemma 8. Let schools’ extended priorities be fully transferable. If Tk(µ) 6= {∅}, then
there is a Pareto Improvement cycle φ ∈ G′(µ, λ) such that for each ij ∈ φ, and each
j′ ∈ T (µ), µ(j) Ri µ(j′).
Proof. Note that for each i ∈ T (µ) there is j ∈ T (µ) such that i ∈ D˜(µ,λ)(j) and by the
previous lemma, i ∈ X(µ,λ)(j). Note that each i ∈ T (µ) points to at least some j ∈ T (µ)
such that µ(i) 6= µ(j). Since T (µ) is finite, there is at least one cycle in G′(µ, λ).
Lemma 9. Let schools’ extended priorities be fully transferable. If there are a pair of
improvement cycles φ, φ′ in G′(µ, λ) such that φ ⊂ φ′, then φ′ \φ is an improvement cycle
in G′(µ, λ)
Proof. Since φ and φ′ are improvement cycles and priorities are fully transferable, there
is i ∈ φ and j, k such that ij ∈ φ, ik ∈ φ′, and i′ ∈ φ′ \ φ such that i′j ∈ φ′. Since ij ∈ φ
andik ∈ φ′, then µ(j) = µ(k). On the other hand, i′j ∈ φ′ and µ(j) = µ(k) implies that
i′ ∈ X(µ,λ)(k). Hence, φ′ \ φ is a improvement cycle in G′(µ, λ).
The previous lemmas show that under fully transferable characteristics the logic of
the TTCM can be applied to find (ex-post) stable Pareto improvement cycles. This logic
allows us to define a subclass of SETC algorithms.
Top Trade SETC Algorithms:
Step 0: Let (µ0, λ0) be a stable extended matching.
Step k ≥ 1: Given an extended matching (µk−1, λk−1),
(k.1) if there is no improvement cycle in G(µk−1, λk−1), then the algorithm terminates
and (µk−1, λk−1) is the matching obtained,
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(k.2) otherwise, solve one of the improvement cycles in φ ∈ G′(µk−1, λk−1), and let µk =
φk ◦ µk−1, and λk be defined correspondingly to the definition of SETC.
It is worth to note that the Top Trade SETC Algorithms are a family of algorithms.
While Lemma 9 implies that the selection of maximal improvement cycles is not an
issue for the algorithm, it may be the case that several improvement cycles share some
students. Note that under fully transferable priorities, in G′(µ, λ) each student points to
all the students assigned to her best preferred school. Therefore, every selection rule for
mutually incompatible improvement cycles generates a different algorithm and different
potential outcomes.
In the next result, we prove that the application of the Top Trade SETC starting at
the SOSM with the initial endowment of transferable characteristics yields the outcome
of the sequential application of the TTCM on the SOSM matching,
Theorem 2. Let µ0 be the SOSM and (µ, λ) an outcome of and Top Trade SETC algo-
rithm under µ0, then µ is the matching obtained as an outcome of Gale’s TTCM under
the initial allocation of seats µ0.
Proof. By Lemmas 7 and 8, under monotonous and fully transfer preferences, the Top
Trade SETC algorithm is well defined. At each stage of the algorithm, there is a group of
students who obtain a seat at their best preferred available school till the stage where no
Pareto improvement is possible, therefore µ is the outcome obtained after the application
of the TTCM from the initial matching µ0. If the initial matching is the SOSM, the stable
matching selected by the Top Trade SETC coincides with the application of the TTCM
after the selection of the SOSM.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion relating the outcome of a Top Trade
SETC and EADAM (Kesten, 2010). The motivation behind the EADAM is to explore
the source of inefficiency of the SOSM due to fairness constraints and improve it on the
efficiency dimension. An important observation made by Kesten (2010) is that the priority
of student i at school s might not help her to get a better school under the SOSM at
all. If this is the case, giving i the lowest priority at s instead of her current priority
would not change her assignment and the DA would possibly select a matching that
Pareto dominates the SOSM with the original priorities. Motivated by this observation,
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Kesten (2010) introduces the EADAM in a setting that allows students to consent for the
violation of their own priorities. Clearly, our frameworks are different since we provide the
foundations for a weaker notion of fairness, while Kesten (2010) considers the possibility of
students dispensing with their priority rights. On the other hand, when priorities are fully
transferable fairness restrictions that prevent mutually profitable exchange of assignments
disappear as they do when all students consent. The structure of the EADAM (Kesten,
2010; Tang and Yu, 2014) implies that the consent of students allows for generating the
best exchange available of schools’ seats between students with respect the SOSM. Thus,
from Theorem 2 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. When priorities are fully transferable, the EADAM matching can be ob-
tained with the application of a Top Trade SETC algorithm starting with the SOSM ex-
tended matching.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we generalize the school choice problem by defining school priorities on
(transferable) students’ characteristics. We define a family of algorithms– Student Ex-
change with Transferable Characteristics (SETC) class– that starting at a (ex-post) stable
extended matching produce an (ex-post) stable extended matching that is not Pareto
dominated by another (ex-post) stable extended matching. Moreover, any constrained
efficient extended matching that Pareto improves upon a stable extended matching can
be obtained via an algorithm in the SETC class. Finally, we show that an algorithm in
the SETC class selects the outcome obtained with the iterated application of SOSM and
TTCM when all students’ characteristics are transferable.
Although the focus of this work has been on the application to school choice, there are
further natural applications of the model. Recent research on the allocation of medical
resources under triage has proved the possibilities of encompassing ethical values with the
fair allocation of a single scarce resource by reserving part of the capacity to some groups
of individuals (Pathak et al., 2020) Our work provides techniques that allow for Pareto
improvements on fair allocations, when there is more than one type of object, ethical
considerations may be relaxed, and transfers of characteristics are allowed.
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